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I. INTRODUCTION. 
The Department argues extensively that the Commission's factual findings are 
supported by substantial evidence and therefore must be affirmed. In doing so, the Department 
mischaracterizes the record regarding several facts. In reality the key facts are not in dispute, 
and no evidence supports certain of the Commission's findings. 
Additionally, the Department carries forward the Commission's erroneous 
interpretation ofldaho Code§§ 72-1351A(l)(a) and 72-1351(5)(b), by asserting that a transfer of 
"part" or a "portion" of a business occurs only when a distinct business unit is transferred, and 
that any other circumstance constitutes transfer of the entire business. The plain meaning of the 
statute is not so restrictive, and the Court may conclude as a matter of law that under the 
undisputed facts here, only a partial transfer occurred. 
II. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY. 
A. No substantial evidence supports the 
Commission's findings where the undisputed 
evidence is contrary to the finding, and the 
Court freelv reviews whether the Commission 
properly applied the law to the undisputed 
evidence. 
The substantial evidence standard applies where factual disputes exist and the 
Commission is called upon to make determinations of credibility. Dinius v. Loving Care & 
More. Inc., 133 Idaho 572, 576, 990 P.2d 738 (1999). Here, the relevant evidence is not in 
dispute (although, as discussed further below, the Commission did erroneously conclude that 
certain facts were disputed when in fact the evidence was undisputed, and Department repeats 
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that mischaracterization). As a result, this Court may freely review whether the Commission's 
application of the law to the undisputed facts was erroneous. 
Idaho Code § 72-732 sets forth the standard of review to be applied in an appeal 
to the Supreme Court from a decision of the Industrial Commission. This Court may set aside the 
order or award upon any of the following grounds: (1) the Commission's findings of fact are not 
based on any substantial competent evidence; (2) the Commission has acted without jurisdiction 
or in excess of its powers; (3) the findings of fact, order or award were procured by fraud; ( 4) the 
findings of fact do not as a matter of law support the order or award. 
LC. § 72-732( 4) provides that this Court may set aside the order where "[t]he 
findings of fact do not as a matter of law support the order or award." In other words, this Court 
must set aside the order of the Commission where it failed to make "a proper application of law 
to the evidence." Wachtler v. Calnon, 90 Idaho 468, 472, 413 P.2d 449, 451 (1966); see also 
Bortz v. Payless Drug Store, 110 Idaho 942, 945, 719 P.2d 1202 (1986). 1 Here, the issues are: 
(a) whether the Commission coffectly interpreted the meaning of Idaho Code §72-1351(5)(b)'s 
requirement of a pro-rata allocation of experience rating where a "portion" of a business was 
transferred rather than "all or substantially all" of the business; and (b) whether it correctly 
interpreted Idaho Code § 71-13 51A(1 )(a)' s reference to transfer of the predecessor's trade or 
business resulting in mandatory transfer of the predecessor's entire experience rating to apply to 
This Court has determined the whether the Commission correctly applied the law to undisputed facts in 
other settings. Thus, for example, it has held that where the evidence is undisputed and "is reasonably susceptible to 
only one interpretation," whether a claimant falls within the odd-lot category is a conclusion of law. Lyons v. Ind'! 
Spec. Ind. Fund, 98 Idaho 403, 407 n. 2 (1977). 
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something less than a transfer of the entire business. This Court exercises free review over the 
Commission's legal conclusions. Moore v. Melaleuca, 137 Idaho 23, 26, 43 P.3d 782, 785 
(2002). "Interpretation of [a] statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free 
review." Lane Ranch P'ship v. City of Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 89, 175 P.3d 776, 778 (2007). 
B. The Commission's findings regarding the 
responsibilities of the former Diamond Z 
employees and continuitv of business 
relationships from Diamond Z to Rule, are not 
supported bv anv evidence, and the 
Department's brief mischaracterizes the record 
regarding several issues. 
As Rule pointed out in its opening brief, key factual findings by the Commission 
are contrary to the undisputed evidence in the record. Presumably in order to support its 
argument that factual disputes exist and that the substantial evidence standard should therefore 
control, the Department mischaracterizes several facts. Below are examples, compared to the 
actual testimony in the record: 
1. Repeating the Commission's most glaring error, the Department asserts 
that Rule "did not address" whether the 34 employees not listed in Exhibit C were put to work on 
Diamond Z business after being hired by Rule Steel. Brief of Respondent, p. 14. This is 
completely false. As Rule pointed out in its opening brief, Greg Burkhart testified without 
dispute that the former Diamond Z employees hired by Rule that were not included on Exhibit C 
did not perform any work related to Diamond Z after Rule hired them. Most were transferred to 
Rule's container division, located in the existing Rule facility on Middleton Road. To the extent 
those employees remain at Rule, they continue to work in the same area of Rule's business. Id., 
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p. 87, 11. 22 - p. 88, L 13. Likewise, Steve Peel testified, without dispute, that of the employees 
terminated by Diamond Z and eventually re-hired by Rule, only four people out of 44 began 
attempting to market Diamond Z products. Another six former Diamond Z employees were 
hired at Rule to work primarily in Rule's existing business, but occasionally worked on the 
manufacture of Diamond Z products as a secondary duty once the need later arose (several 
months later). Id., p. 54, I. 11 - p. 55, I. 20. Simply put, there is no factual dispute, and the 
Commission's finding to the contrary is not supported by any evidence.2 
2. The Department states in its brief: "After Predecessor closed, Employer 
continued business relations with some of the same vendors used by Predecessor." Respondent's 
Brief, p. 5. Implicit in this statement is the assertion that Rule took up business with Diamond 
Z's vendors in order to continue Diamond's ongoing operations. This assertion is false and the 
statement in the Department's brief is misleading. It is based on the investigator's testimony 
regarding a phone conversation she had with Steve Peel in October 2011. The investigator 
actually testified: "Mr. Peel stated that Rule Steel does use some of the same vendors of 
Diamond Z, mostly because there is [sic] only a few vendors that sell the steel that they need." 
DOL (for the first time) accuses Rule of "SUT A Dumping" (Brief of Respondent, p. 9), but no evidence in 
the record supports this accusation. Diamond Z's business was effectively dead. It is undisputed that almost all ( 40 
of 44) of the employees Rule hired did not take up the former Diamond Z business but went to work in Rule's 
existing business lines. Those workers are thus irrelevant; the case must be analyzed solely from the facts that 
actually relate to Diamond Z's business: Out of 60 employees finally terminated by Diamond Z, Rule hired only 
four to attempt to market DZ products, and no existing manufacturing operation was carried over. Rule did not 
begin to manufacture grinders until several months later. The major pieces of equipment Rule purchased from a 
third party were put to work in its existing business. These are all undisputed facts. They do not remotely support 
the accusation of SUTA-dumping, or a finding that Diamond Z's entire trade or business was transferred. 
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Tr., p. 13, 11. 8-10. Rule Steel has manufactured steel products for 50 years; if anything, it has 
used vendors for longer than Diamond Z. Thus, the investigator also testified on cross-
examination: "Well, I don't know which specific steel vendor. Mr. Peel just indicated that they 
do share steel vendors because they are similar types of businesses and there are only a certain 
number of steel vendors who provide types of steel needed for either business," and "there are 
only a few vendors that you can buy steel from, so all metal fabricators, which would be 
Diamond Zand Rule, use common vendors." Tr., p. 40, 11. 6-10, 21-23. In other words, Rule 
does not have a vendor in common with Diamond Z because it transferred a business from 
Diamond Z and needed the vendor to continue that business, but because it also produces steel 
products in its existing lines of business. This evidence was clear and undisputed. Moreover, it 
is clear from the transcript that the testimony relates to the use of steel vendors at the time of the 
investigation, i.e., in September or October of 2011, not at the time of the alleged transfer. In the 
end, it establishes nothing about the continuity of business relationships at the time of the alleged 
transfer in 2009. 
3. The Department states in its brief: "Employer's website displayed 
Predecessor's logo and represented Employer as the manufacturer of Predecessor's grinders." 
Brief of Respondent, p. 5. Implicit in this statement is the assertion that the websites reflect the 
facts as of the time of the alleged transfer, and that Rule continued Diamond Z's business 
unabated. In fact, the Exhibit referred to in the Department's Brief, Exhibit 9, shows the state of 
Rule Steel's website on October 13, 2011 - well over two years after the alleged transfer. The 
investigator admitted this fact, and also acknowledged that she did not begin her investigation 
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until September or October of 2011. Tr., p. 33, 1. 17 - p. 34, 1. 40. There is no evidence in the 
record regarding the state of either company's website in 2009.3 
4. The Department asserts in its brief: "In 2009, Employer began marketing 
Predecessor's grinders and offered replacement parts and services for those grinders." Brief of 
Respondent, p. 3. Elsewhere in its brief the Department similarly asserts: "Employer 
immediately began offering for sale Predecessor's grinders and offered replacement parts for 
those grinders." Id., p. 11. While Rule has acknowledged that out of 60 terminated Diamond Z 
employees it hired four marketing employees to attempt to restaii the dead business from scratch, 
none of the testimony cited by the Department reflects that Rule immediately (or at any time in 
2009) "offered replacement parts and services." The investigator actually testified: "In 2010 
Rule Steel manufactured four of those grinders. Rule Steel also built replacement parts for 
Diamond Z products." Tr., p. 13, 11. 5-7. The investigator's testimony at page 25 of the 
transcript reflects her observations of current facts and not as of the time of the alleged transfer 
in 2009: "Diamond Z products continue to be manufactured and the servicing and repair of 
Diamond Z products is done by Rule Steel." Tr., p. 25, 11. 4-6. The testimony at pages 67 and 
68 by Mr. Peel refers to whether Rule had the capability to manufacture grinders, not whether it 
did so or whether it offered parts and service in 2009. Tr., p. 67, I. 16 - p. 68, I. 3. The 
remainder of the testimony cited by the Department relates to the four employees who attempted 
Elsewhere in its brief the Department argues that rule "failed to provide any testimony that the websites 
were not reflective of Employer or Predecessor in 2009[.]" Brief of Respondent, p. 15. Apparently, the Department 
would place the burden on the employer to disprove facts of which there is no evidence in the record to begin with. 
There is no authority for this proposition. There is no evidence in the record at all regarding Rule's use of the 
Diamond Z logo before it first sold a grinder in 2010, and therefore nothing for Rule to rebut. 
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to restart marketing of the former Diamond Z products. Tr., p. 54, 11. 2-10, p. 55, 11. 1-7, p. 80, 
IL 21-15. None of the testimony cited by the Department supports its apparent assertion that 
Diamond Z's manufacturing operations were carried on without interruption, and in fact the 
undisputed evidence, as Rule as set fo1ih at length, is the opposite. 
5. The Department asserts in its brief: "Steve Peel brought Greg Burkhart 
into Predecessor's management to help him make decisions." Brief of Respondent, p. 4. The 
testimony cited by the Department does not remotely support this statement. On page 22 of the 
transcript, the investigator testified: "Mr. Burkhart is currently and has previously been a 
manager of Rule Steel. Mr. Peel was the manager of Diamond Z prior to the business ceasing 
operation. Mr. Peel cmTently holds a management position with Rule Steel and is the primary 
contact as shown by the official address listed with the Idaho Department of Labor listing Mr. 
Peel's name and address." Tr., p. 22, 1. 20 - p. 23., L 3. On page 52, Mr. Peel testified in 
response to question whether he was involved in the decision by Rule Steel whether to hire 
former Diamond Z employees: "Some with - with Greg Burkhart, going through some 
discussions about potential new employees for Rule Steel." This has to do with Rule Steel's 
business, not Diamond Z's. Tr., p. 52, IL 23-25. Similarly, on page 63, Mr. Peel testified 
regarding the decisions by Rule Steel whether to hire former Diamond Z employees. Tr., p. 63, 1. 
3-17 ("Actually, there was actually some resistance to Mr. Burkhart even wanting to bring on 
any of the Diamond Z employees, because, you know, they were coming from a failing 
company, so they were just concerned about attitude, you know, some of the prior work culture 
and so there was there was some concerns about that. But we discussed some of the people 
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and, then, Rule Steel came and put them in play."). On pages 75 and 76, Mr. Peel testified 
regarding his own roles at Diamond Zand Diamond Z, and not about Mr. Burkhart. Tr., p. 75, 1. 
2 p. 76, 1. 4. 
6. The Department places much emphasis on the fact that following 
Diamond Z's demise, Rule moved some of its employees into the space formerly occupied by 
Diamond Z. Brief of Respondent, pp. 3, 4. It then asserts: "Employer owned the property leased 
to predecessor and retained control of that property following Predecessor's closure." Brief of 
Respondent, p. 5. This is completely false. In fact, Steve Peel testified: "I mean Rule Steel has 
continued to stay in its operation like it's been for the last probably 50 years and I do own all the 
property, including the building, and I expressed in the - in the conversation with Ms. Henry 
that I do own all the property, including the buildings, and we did find it appropriate after 
Diamond Z closed, because some of these new contract were bringing in, the Diamond Z 
building had a bigger facility and had more space to utilize some of that fabrication. So, we did 
move the Rule Steel primary over there, but we still occupy all the other buildings." Tr., p. 70, 1. 
19 - p. 71, 1. 5. In other words, Steve Peel, not Rule Steel, owned the building formerly 
occupied by Diamond Z, and Rule moved some of its existing operations into the vacated space; 
it did not continue the business of Diamond Z in the space. In other words, the common address 
is irrelevant. Rule Steel never leased the space to Diamond Z. 
7. The Department argues that "there was a continuity of business 
relationships" in part by stating: "Employer has contracts with some of the same dealers as 
Predecessor." Brief of Respondent, p. 13. Implicit in this statement is the assertion that Rule 
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continued picked up Diamond Z's dealer relationships unabated. This is false. In fact, Steve 
Peel testified that all of Diamond Z's dealer contracts (between six and eight) were terminated in 
2009, and he was involved in that process. Tr., p. 65, II. 14-24. He was not involved in Rule 
Steel's efforts to establish its own dealer network, when it later worked to re-start the business of 
building grinders. Greg Burkhart testified that Rule did not simply take on all of Diamond Z's 
former dealers, and testified: "We started in 2010 started to reevaluate even having a business 
model was even put together. Today I'm not sure that I have even - there is very few dealers we 
have under contract, maybe even maybe even one or two that are actually in contract, because 
we looked at it just because the market and because the way we do business it was more of a -
we sell directly to anything that happens, not as much of a dealer network compared to the 
Diamond Z approach to it." Tr., p. 91, II. 13-21. He later confirmed that Rule did not contract 
with dealers until 2010. Tr., p. 94, II. 13-17.4 In other words, there was no continuity from 
Diamond Z to Rule regarding dealers, and the Commission's finding of "continuity of business 
relationships" was not supported by substantial evidence. 
C. Statutory construction. 
Statutory construction begins with the literal words of the statute. Thomson v. 
City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 478, 50 P.3d 488, 493 (2002). The words of a statute are given 
their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning. State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829, 25 P.3d 850, 852 
(2001 ). Moreover, "the plain, obvious and rational meaning is always to be preferred to any 
The Department confuses other facts. At various places in its brief, it asse11s that Diamond Z "ceased 
operations in May of2009" (BriefofRespondent, pp. 5, 13), and that it "ceased operations in July of2009" (Id., p. 
11). In fact, Steve Peel testified without rebuttal that Diamond Z manufactured its last grinder in March 2009. Tr., 
p. 50, II. 18-22. 
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curious, narrow hidden sense." Higginson v. Westergard, 100 Idaho 687, 691, 604 P.2d 51, 55 
(1979). In construing a statute, words and phrases are to be assumed to have been used in their 
popular sense, if they have not acquired a technical meaning. Filer Mut. Tel. Co. v. Idaho State 
Tax Comm'n, 76 Idaho 256, 261, 281P.2d478 (1955). 
If the language of a statute is ambiguous, the Court may consider the social and 
economic results of a decision on the meaning of the statute. Herndon v. West, 87 Idaho 335, 
393 P.2d 35 (1964). "[W]hen a literal reading of a provision will work an unreasonable or 
absurd result, if a reasonable intent of the Legislature can be arrived at, the court should so 
construe the act as to arrive at such intention rather than an absurdity." Smallwood v. Jeter, 42 
Idaho 169, 184, 244 P. 149, 153 (1926). 
D. The correct interpretation of Idaho Code §§ 72-
1351A(l)(a) and 72-1351(5)(b) is that only "part" 
or a "portion" of a business is transferred where 
only a few marketing employees were 
transferred to the successor, no ongoing 
manufacturing operation was transferred, and 
the remainder of former predecessor employees 
hired were put to work in the successor's existing 
business. 
Whether a pro-rata rating transfer should occur in this case pursuant to Idaho 
Code §§ 72-1351A(l)(a) and 72-1351(5)(b) revolves around whether the words "part" and 
"portion" are strictly limited in meaning to a segregable business unit, which is the interpretation 
the Department apparently uses, or whether "part" and "portion" mean something less restrictive 
and include the fact pattern here. Additionally, to adopt the Department's interpretation, the 
Court must conclude that the term "its trade or business" as used in Idaho Code § 71-
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13 51 A(l )(a) means something less than an entire trade or business, even though it is 
distinguished from "part" or a "portion" of the trade or business in the same sentence of that 
section. 
The Department argues: "Whether there is a partial transfer of a business is not 
based on the number of employees transferred. Predecessor had one business enterprise. 
Predecessor was in the business of manufacturing grinders. Employer continued Predecessor's 
business of manufacturing grinders. Employer carries on Predecessor's entire business 
function." Brief of Respondent, p. 20. It also asserts: "Employer continued to make 
Predecessor's grinders, the entire business enterprise of Predecessor." Id., p. 20. 
Of course, it is undisputed that Rule did not carry on Diamond Z's manufacturing 
operation - it was defunct - and it is further undisputed that almost all of the former Diamond Z 
employees that Rule hired were put to work in Rule's existing business operations. The 
Department argues elsewhere that Rule had the "capability" to manufacture grinders from the 
time it hired the former Diamond Z workers (Brief of Respondent, p. 12), but having the 
capability to conduct a business is not the same as actually conducting it. The Department's 
argument ignores the actual function to which the former Diamond Z employees were assigned. 
Idaho Code§ 72-1351A(l)(a) provides in pertinent paii: 
If a covered employer transfers its trade or business, or a portion 
thereof, to another employer, whether or not a covered employer 
within the meaning of section 72-1315, Idaho Code, and, at the 
time of the transfer, there is substantially common ownership, 
management or control of the two (2) employers, then the 
experience rating account attributable to the transferred trade or 
business shall be transferred to the employer to whom such 
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business is so transferred. The rates of both employers shall be 
recalculated using the methods provided in section 72-13 51 ( 5)(b) 
and either ( c )(i) or ( c )(ii), Idaho Code. [Emphasis added.] 
Idaho Code § 72-1351 ( 5)(b) then provides in pertinent part: 
Whenever any individual or type of organization, whether or not a 
covered employer within the meaning of section 72-1315, Idaho 
Code, in any manner succeeds to, or acquires, part of the business 
of an employer who at the time of acquisition was a covered 
employer, and such portion of the business is continued by the 
successor, so much of the separate experience rating account of the 
predecessor as is attributable to the portion of the business 
transferred, as determined on a pro rata basis in the same ratio that 
the wages of covered employees properly allocable to the 
transferred portion of the business bears to the payroll of the 
predecessor in the last four (4) completed calendar quarters 
immediately preceding the date of transfer, shall ... be transferred 
to the successor employer for the purpose of determining such 
successor's liability and taxable wage rate[.] [Emphasis added.] 
Thus, these two sections distinguish between the transfer of a "trade or business" 
and the transfer of a "part" or "po1iion" of the trade or business. Of necessity, the phrase "its 
trade or business" in Idaho Code § 72-1351A(l)(a) must mean the entire trade or business, 
because of the distinction in the same sentence between that phrase and "or a portion thereof," 
and the use of the terms "part" and "portion" in Idaho Code§ 72-1351(5)(b). 
Likewise, "part" and "portion" necessarily mean something less than the entire 
business. 5 The question here is whether, as the Depaiiment argues, the language "or a po1iion 
thereof' in§ 72-1351A(l)(a) and the paiiial rating transfer calculation in§ 72-1351(5)(b) apply 
only where a discrete or segregable business unit is transferred from a company with more than 
"Part" and "portion" are not defined elsewhere in the Employment Security Law. 
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one line of business, or whether they apply at least to the undisputed facts here, where only a 
small percentage of former employees of the predecessor employer were hired to conduct the 
same business as at the predecessor employer, and most other former employees of the 
predecessor that were hired were instead put to work in the successor's existing business 
operations. 
The word "paii" is defined by one dictionary as "(1): one of the often indefinite or 
unequal subdivisions into which something is or is regarded as divided and which together 
constitute the whole; (2) : an essential portion or integral element." http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/paii. Merriam-Webster also advises that the word "is a general term 
appropriate when indefiniteness is required." Id. Likewise, Black's Law Dictionary defines 
"part" as: "An integral portion, something essentially belonging to a larger whole; that which 
together with another or others makes up a whole." Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979), at 
I 006. Meanwhile, "portion" is defined as "an often limited part of a whole" 
(http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/portion), or as "any part of a whole, either 
separated from or integrated with it." http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/portion.6 
Again, in construing a statute, words and phrases are to be assumed to have been 
used in their popular sense, if they have not acquired a technical meaning (Filer Mut. Tel. Co. v. 
Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 76 Idaho 256, 261, 281 P.2d 478 (1955)), and "the plain, obvious and 
rational meaning is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow hidden sense." Higginson v. 
Westergard, 100 Idaho 687, 691, 604 P.2d 51, 55 (1979). 
The Court may look to dictionary definitions to determine the plain and ordinary meaning of words. E.g., 
Two-Jinn, Inc. v. Id. Dept. of Ins., 2013 Ida. LEXIS 5, *6-*8. 
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The above definitions indicate that plain and ordinary meanings of the terms 
"paii" and "portion" are general, not specific or technical. Nothing in those definitions suggests 
that the terms "part" and "portion" are specific enough terms to be reasonably interpreted to 
mean only a segregable business unit, as used in Idaho Code § 72-1351A(l)(a) and § 72-
1351 (5)(b ). Rather, both are general words, and by using them the legislature necessarily 
intended that they include a range of factual scenarios, including that present in this case. If the 
legislature had intended to limit partial rating transfers to only those specific situations where a 
discrete unit of a business was transferred, it could easily have done so. 
Rule Steel presented undisputed evidence that: 
1. Rule did not acquire the assets from Diamond Z but from two third 
parties; 
2. Of approximately 60 employees who were the last terminated from 
Diamond Z, 44 were eventually hired by Rule Steel over a period of months; 
3. Of the 44 workers hired by Rule, all but four (in other words, four out of 
60 that were terminated by Diamond Z) were put to work in Rule Steel's existing business, 
although another six eventually worked part-time as a secondary duty when Rule began building 
grinders nearly a year later. 
4. None of Diamond Z's several management employees were hired by Rule, 
except for Pat Crawford. 
5. Diamond Z's dealer network was terminated in 2008 and 2009 and Rule 
only contracted with two dealers of its own in 2010. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT - 14 
6. Diamond Z sold its last grinder in March 2009; 
7. Rule Steel did not sell a grinder until February 2010. 
8. During the interim eleven months, 40 of the 44 workers hired by Rule 
Steel worked in Rule Steel's existing business. 
9. Of the workers hired by Rule, 34 of 44 continued to work exclusively in 
Rule Steel's existing business thereafter. 
10. The physical assets acquired from Diamond Z were put to use by Rule in 
its existing business. 
11. To the extent Rule and Diamond Z shared a common steel vendor, it was 
because Rule was already in the steel fabrication business and used the vendor for that purpose. 
Given these undisputed facts, under a correct interpretation of Idaho Code § 72-
1351(5)(b) and§ 72-1351A(l)(a), the only reasonable conclusion is that if a transfer occurred, it 
included only a "part" or "portion" of the former Diamond Z business and only a partial transfer 
of Diamond Z's experience rating should occur. As a result, the Commission failed to make "a 
proper application of law to the evidence." Wachtler v. Calnon, 90 Idaho 468, 472, 413 P.2d 
449, 451 (1966). 7 
The purposes of Idaho's unemployment law are not served by following the 
cramped interpretation used by the Department. One of those purposes is "encouraging 
Under the Commission's interpretation of the statute, a full rating transfer would apparently be mandated 
even if Rule had never hired the "disputed" 40 employees, and hired only four out of 60 of the terminated Diamond 
Z employees, simply because it had the "capability" to carry on the former Diamond Z business. Under this 
interpretation, the presence of four new employees would allow the experience rating over I 00 employees to almost 
triple. This would be an absurd result, and points out how the Commission's interpretation is unreasonable. 
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employers to provide more stable employment." Idaho Code§ 72-1302. The opposite effect is 
created here under the Department's interpretation. It is undisputed that Rule attempted to help 
the workers terminated from Diamond Z by interviewing and eventually hiring for its own 
purposes those workers that it could over the following months, if they had skills that could be 
used in Rule's existing business. However, if the Department's interpretation is correct, the 
better course for an employer to protect its own interest would be to leave the terminated 
employees from a sister company unemployed, and seek out entirely new workers to fill its 
needs. The Department's interpretation discourages stability rather than encouraging it. 
Transferring Diamond Z's rating allocable to the "disputed" 40 employees would 
make sense were they to be involved in the same business they had previously - the manufacture 
of grinders - and thus could reasonably expect to continue roughly the same unemployment 
experience as a group (although one could also expect, under Rule's management, that their 
unemployment experience would improve). It makes no sense to transfer the previous rating 
where it is undisputed that the 40 employees were immediately put to work in Rule's own 
existing business, where by effective management Rule had achieved a superior unemployment 
expenence. The employees hired for non-Diamond Z purposes were not "part of the business 
transferred" because they no longer performed Diamond Z-related work. 
III. CONCLUSION. 
The Commission's findings regarding continuity of business operations and the 
responsibilities of most of the former Diamond Z workers hired by Rule were not supported by 
substantial evidence. In addition, the Commission's application of Idaho Code§ 72-1351A(l)(a) 
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and was erroneous. The question in this case is whether an employer with over 100 employees 
should be subjected to the entire experience rating of the predecessor, almost tripling its 
experience rating, when it is undisputed that it acquired the assets of a defunct business and only 
four out of 44 of the former employees of predecessor continued to do the same job when hired 
by the successor employer. The obvious answer is to the question is no. The Commission's 
Decision should be reversed. 
Dated this ~ day of February, 2013. 
MARCUS, CHRISTIAN, HARDEE & DA VIES, LLP 
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